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Homo economicus in a Big Society: understanding middle-class activism and 
NIMBYism towards new housing developments 
Problems of housing supply and affordability in England have long been recognised 
by policy-makers. A key barrier to supply is seen to be community activism by so-
called NIMBYs (not-in-my-back-yard).  The localism policy agenda, or devolving 
decision-making down to the local level, is central to how the UK Coalition 
government seek to overcome this opposition. This conceives NIMBYism as a 
demonstration of homo economicus – of the rationality of economic beings seeking 
to maximise their utility. In this view, residents would not accept large urban 
extensions in suburban areas because they took on localised costs with no obvious 
benefits, unless incentivised appropriately. In this paper we use analysis of British 
Social Attitudes Survey data as well as the results of the first review of middle-class 
activism in relation to public services to identify the likelihood of residents being 
incentivised by this version of localism to accept new housing. We conclude that the 
evidence on the individual and collective attitudes suggests that it is unlikely that 
localism will deliver new housing. Importantly, the political power of affluent and 
professional groups means they can ensure that their opposition is heard, 
particularly in the neighbourhood plans delivered through localism. The paper argues 
that planning for housing needs to understand communities as homo democraticus – 
as actively engaged in negotiating between complex interests with respect to support 
for new housing.  
Prof. Glen Bramley, Dr Peter Matthews, Heriot-Watt University; Prof. Annette 
Hastings, University of Glasgow 
 
Introduction 
The paper is concerned with the potential impact of the UK Coalition Government’s 
‘localism’ and  ‘Big Society’ agendas on the system of planning for housing and 
providing land for new housing in England. Since the publication of the Conservative 
Party’s pre-election “green paper” Open Source Planning (2009) and its 
implementation in the Localism Act 2010, a regime change in planning has begun 
(Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012). Previous policies with housing targets advised 
by the UK Government and delivered through regional planning, have been replaced 
by a policies favouring ‘localism’ and local ‘empowerment’. Thus, under these 
reforms, decisions are to be devolved to the local level, ideally through new 
neighbourhood plans written by local communities, or through the Local Plan of a 
planning authority. The overall policy narrative is that planning has moved away from 
top-down, central targets, particularly for housing, and that local communities are 
empowered to decide what development they want and where (Communities and 
Local Government, 2010).  
These reforms to the system of planning for new housing are thus one of the most 
dramatic and far-reaching ways that the intellectual project of the Big Society and its 
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associated localism policies has had an impact on public policy (Allmendinger and 
Haughton, 2012, Baker and Wong, 2012). This is very much a reform driven by an 
imperative to remove central state involvement within a policy area and give power 
to local communities (Conservative Party, 2009). The national or regional scale is no 
longer seen as appropriate for making strategic decisions as to where housing will 
get built (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012). However, it requires the “Big Society” 
on the ground to be delivered. Here we understand the “Big Society” as 
encapsulating a revival of civic society, communitarianism and paternalist self-help 
as a counter to “Big Government” (Blond, 2010; Macmillan, 2013; Sage, 2012). For 
neighbourhood planning to be successful communities need cohesive groups with 
enough capacity to consult widely and negotiate a highly technical system and 
produce an approved plan.  
We are concerned here with whether these reforms in planning for housing will 
therefore enable affluent, well-educated and well-connected groups to oppose new 
housing development. With regard to the reforms of the planning system contained 
in the Localism Act (2010) and neighbourhood planning, this may be particularly the 
case in areas of high development pressure such as the South East of England and 
‘there is concern and criticism that these changes might result in a drastic reduction 
in new homes approved and built’ (Buser, 2012: 12; Allmendinger and Haughton, 
2012, Inch, 2012, Jacobs and Manzi, 2012, Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012, Sullivan, 
2012).  
To interrogate whether the Coalition’s localist planning policies will empower middle-
class community groups to oppose new housing developments, we first of all 
theorise opposition and analyse how it is understood in policy. We suggest that the 
localist policies view opponents as homo economicus – as individuals responding to 
costs and benefits. We contrast this view of opposition with a view which conceives 
of individuals within broader socio-political structures operating as homo 
democraticus. We then use a two-stage analysis to apply this to predict whether 
localism will lead to a reduction in new housing being built. The first stage is to 
analyse the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) (Park et al., 2011) in order to 
understand the geographical extent of resistance to new development, its 
conditionality and its relationship with the political allegiances of people in these 
areas. The second is to explore the implications for this context of a theoretical 
model of middle-class community activism produced by the authors designed to 
understand the impact of self-interested affluent, or middle-class, residents on public 
service distribution. (anonymous and anonymous 2013). Together both stages of the 
analysis  suggest that it is very unlikely that the UK Government reforms of planning 
for housing will produce an increase in housing delivery. 
Theorising and explaining planning for housing and local opposition in 
England 
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Land use planning has been and remains one of the most powerful regulatory 
interventions in the UK. It is important to note that the planning system in the UK has 
been devolved to the four nations and regions which have developed their own 
reforms; in this paper we focus on the English system and particularly planning for 
housing (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006). The regulatory power of the planning system 
remains largely in place despite a prolonged period (since 1979) when governments 
of all main parties have embraced a market-led approach to economic policy, 
supporting market processes rather than regulating or challenge them, including to 
some extent within development planning (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012). 
However, there has long been a recognition that the English planning system has 
failed to deliver new housing development due to the expression of collective 
opposition through the electoral process, and in processes of planning for new 
housing themselves (Hall, 1973, Sturzaker, 2010). The period around 2004 saw the 
‘sudden rediscovery’ of housing supply as a major policy issue in England after thirty 
years’ slumber (Bramley 2007), crystallized in the Barker Review (2004) and the 
then UK Government’s quite strong policy response to this (Barker, 2006). This 
paralleled planning reforms in England with the introduction of Local Development 
Frameworks and Regional Spatial Strategies, meant to streamline the plan-making 
process and thus plan-led decisions (Baker and Wong, 2012). Housing demand was 
strong and house prices rose to unprecedented levels which, despite low interest 
rates, represented a real deterioration in affordability in this period. The analysis by 
Kate Barker concluded that  
‘At the centre of these recommendations is the principal objective that planning 
should take more account of, and use market information…Central to achieving 
change is the recommendation to allocate more land for development…A 
stronger role for regional planning bodies is recommended,…charged with 
setting out advice on market affordability targets, housing numbers, strategic 
growth areas, and co-ordinating links between the key players’.  
(Barker, 2004, p.6) 
In delivering the new plans, Regional Development Agencies and local planning 
authorities had to use long-term housing market analysis and provide sufficient land 
to maintain a housing supply that maintained affordability. Planning agreements 
became more important, including the delivery of significant shares of affordable 
housing (Crook et al 2010). All of this policy effort produced a relatively small result 
on the ground. Annual housing output in England in this period (2007-08) comprised 
170,000 private and 27,000 social completions, making 198,000 in all; in the best 
year, 2007, the total was 225,000), against estimates of requirements in the range 
240-300,000 (NHPAU 2008). The economic crash after 2007 led to a steep fall in 
output, dropping to nearer 100,000 in 2009.  
It is frequently observed that the most prevalent attitude towards new development, 
particularly housing, in the UK is the one captured by the pejorative NIMBY label. 
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Organisations that are strong voices within the planning system, such as the 
Campaign for the Protection of Rural England, have supported policies such as 
greenbelt around urban areas and opposition to rural development, increasingly 
using a discourse of sustainability, to actively resist any development in urban-rural 
fringe and rural areas (Sturzaker, 2010, Sturzaker and Shucksmith, 2012). For the 
UK Conservative party this has been a particular challenge as they need to balance 
their desire to allow the market to deliver new development where it is needed, while 
responding to an electorate that largely lives in suburban and semi-rural commuting 
villages and who are strongly opposed to new development. These are individuals 
who demonstrate NIMBY tendencies – as shown by a number of high-profile cases 
where Cabinet Ministers have opposed new housing development in their own 
constituency while at the same time advocating its necessity at a national level. 
There is a stereotypical view that this attitude to development is predominantly held 
by more affluent households, that we might term “middle-class” in the UK, and who 
are newer residents to suburban or semi-rural areas (Sturzaker, 2010). From this 
perspective, opposition is entirely selfish and self-serving, often the result of 
opponents wishing to maintain the value of their own property, or recreate an 
imagined rural idyll (Sturzaker, 2010; Sturzaker and Shucksmith, 2012).  
During the period of expansionist planning policy, this manifested itself in strong 
opposition to “top-down” housing targets, particularly in the south-east of England 
and similar affluent, commuter-belt areas (Baker and Wong, 2012, Inch, 2012). This 
provided the Conservative party with an issue with strong political traction in key 
marginal constituencies. In Open Source Planning, published before the election, 
they described how they would abolish ‘the entire bureaucratic and undemocratic tier 
of regional planning, including the Regional Spatial Strategies’ and introduce a 
system where: 
‘local people in each neighbourhood – a term we use to include villages, towns, 
estates, wards or other relevant local areas – will be able to specify what kind 
of development and use of land they want to see in their area. This will lead to 
a fundamental and long overdue rebalancing of power, away from the centre 
and back into the hands of local people.’ 
(Conservative Party, 2009: 2) 
That this could lead to a reduction in new development was implicitly incorporated 
into the argument of Open Source Planning – after all many Conservative MPs, 
including the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer – had to contend with 
vocal opposition to new development in their constituencies. Under the Localism Act 
(2010) in England, communities were given the power to develop a neighbourhood 
plan, led by either the local Parish Council or a Neighbourhood Forum (Buser, 2012). 
If a simple majority of residents in a local referendum supported the plan, and it was 
aligned to broader local and national policy, then it would be adopted as the 
development plan for the area. Subsequently it was proposed that if communities 
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accepted new housing then they would receive greater local investment through a 
reformed Community Infrastructure Levy and a New Homes Bonus where the 
increased tax base would be matched by an extra contribution from central 
government for five years (Conservative Party, 2009). Further, the Community 
Infrastructure Levy (CIL), proposed by the previous government, is being 
implemented to streamline the process of receiving planning gain from developers. 
Further reforms from April 2013 mean that up to a quarter of CIL can be given to 
Parish or Town Councils if they had a neighbourhood plan in place.  
Unpacking this policy logic in the Conservative “green paper” Open Source Planning 
NIMBYs are conceived as homo economicus – they are individuals driven by a 
desire to maximise their own utility and who will respond to economic incentives. 
Thus a version of localismthat eventually devolves decisions down to individuals and 
their choices in a market makes narrative sense as a policy story (Conservative 
Party, 2009; Stone, 1989). Local communities gained no or little benefit themselves 
from new development; the largest impact was highly localised costs in terms of 
pressure on existing services, reductions in residential and environmental amenity 
and, ultimately, slower house price rises and it was this that drove NIMBY-type 
activism. Employing the market logic embodied by homo economicus, the 
Conservatives argued that if communities were financially incentivised to accept new 
development then ‘Open Source planning will engage local communities and foster a 
spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship’ in delivering new development 
(Conservative Party, 2009: 2).  
However, we suggest that residents are better understood as homo democraticus – 
individuals within wider socio-cultural structures. The literature which interrogates 
and criticises the NIMBY concept recognises that much of the opposition is valid and 
linked to broader societal concerns such as sustainability and social justice (see: 
Sturzaker, 2011and Ellis, 2004 for overviews). This opposition to new housing can 
also be understood as a ‘social gap’ – many recognise the need for more new 
housing stock, particularly to increase affordability, while planning applications have 
relatively low success rates (Sturzaker, 2011: 558). Further, they bring their sense of 
elective or selective belonging to debates on place and place-making (Watt, 2009, 
Savage, 2010). These residents’ sense of self, social position and belonging to a 
locality is based on their view of their neighbourhood, its history or rurality, for 
example. If this view is threatened by new development then they will oppose this 
forcefully (Watt, 2009). As such, opponents bring complex interests, including their 
economic self-interest, to debates around planning for housing. Further, our review 
of middle-class community activism (Anonymous and Anonymous, 2013) 
demonstrates how such groups can be particularly adept at making their interests 
heard in policy and development decision-making processes. In this way these 
people can be considered the embodiment of the Big Society as civic activism, not 
as atomistic individuals in the mould of homo economicus. Indeed, the danger 
recognised by many is that localism and the Big Society may empower communities 
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and individuals who are already quite powerful (Anonymous and Anonymous, 2013 
submitted).  
Predicting opposition to new housing  
The implementation of the planning proposals in the Localism Act has been 
understandably slow. Planning processes, by their nature, are often delayed and the 
recession has stalled much new development. Although there has been much 
enthusiasm for neighbourhood planning, cuts to planning authority budgets, and very 
little resourcing from the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG; the UK Government department that has national oversight of planning and 
housing policy) after the first 14 pilot areas, means progress on developing plans has 
been slow. A National Audit Office report into the New Homes Bonus identified major 
problems with the ability of government to measure its success (National Audit 
Office, 2013). It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify housing that has been 
delivered specifically because of the bonus, and indeed much of the housing is likely 
to have been planned before the bonus was introduced. Despite these identified 
difficulties in evaluating and analysing the localist reforms to the English planning 
system we can begin to predict what some of its outcomes will be, particularly its 
impact on the planning stance of local planning authorities. To do this we combine 
two analyses to answer two research questions: 
1) How strong is opposition to new development and how does its spatial 
distribution coincide with development pressures in England? 
2) Will the logic of Open Source Planning as implemented in the localism 
reforms of the planning system overcome opposition to new development 
from middle-class communities? 
To answer the first question we have predominantly relied on analysis of the British 
Social Attitudes Survey presented below. These data collected in 2009-10 asked a 
representative sample of around 3,000 people in England, Wales and Scotland their 
attitude to new housing development in their neighbourhood. Further, respondents 
were asked what additional benefits from new development would be required for 
them to shift to support new housing development.  
To answer the second research question, we use the outputs of a review of research 
on community activism by affluent or middle-class individuals and groups 
(Anonymous and Anonymous, 2013). This reviewed 69 studies across public 
services in the UK, USA and Scandinavian nations and used a realist synthesis 
methodology to develop middle-range theory that explains what works, in what 
contexts and how (for more detail on this methodology see: Pawson et al., 2005, 
Pawson, 2006). It uses a “context-mechanisms-outcomes” (CMO) framework to 
unpack the logic by which an intervention in society (usually a policy) might produce 
specific outcomes. In this case we sought to unpack how the mechanism of activism 
by more affluent groups and individuals might produce “the inverse care law” where 
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service provision is in inverse proportion to need (Tudor Hart, 1971) or may create or 
exacerbate unequal service provision and outcomes in a range of different contexts 
(Cn) (figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 - CMO framework for middle-class community activism 
The review synthesised the research evidence with a view to identifying a set of 
causal theories capturing mechanisms by which any outcomes may come about in 
specific contexts. The four ‘causal theories’ are presented in Table 1. These four 
causal theories can be used as rules of thumb, or heuristics, to examine what the 
outcomes in planning for housing may be of localism and associated policies. Thus 
they can be applied to the attitudinal data from BSAS to tease out what the likely 
outcome in policy processes for planning for housing might be. 
Table 1 - Causal Theories of Middle-class Community Activism 
Causal theories Description 
1. The middle-classes and 
interest groups 
The middle-classes are more likely to join 
groups, form groups, and these groups are 
more important in policy-making (e.g. School 
Governing Boards) 
2. The middle-classes as 
individual 
consumers/activists with 
public services 
The middle-classes are more likely to 
complain about public services. When they do 
so they are more likely to get a positive 
response and produce a virtuous circle. 
3. The alignment of cultural 
capital between service 
users and providers 
Middle-class services users are engaging with 
middle-class service providers and this 
alignment of cultural capital is likely to confer 
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advantage especially in coproducing services 
4. Public policies and services 
generally favour the middle-
classes 
Organisational processes and policies 
normalise the needs and complaints of the 
middle-classes 
 
The spatial distribution of NIMBY attitudes 
The general pattern of responses in the BSAS confirms widespread opposition to 
new housing development. Those opposed to local house-building outnumber those 
supportive of it by a ratio of 3:2 (45% vs 30%). While nationally those opposed to 
local building are not a majority of all respondents, they are clearly a majority of 
those who have a view, and more clearly still a majority of those who have a strong 
view (15% vs 5%). If local political decisions are driven mainly by those who hold 
clear or stronger views and can get those views heard, then the prospects for 
increasing house-building would appear poor. Opposition to local house-building is 
stronger among homeowners, (51% vs 24%), with private renters more evenly split 
and social renters substantially in favour. This pattern is unsurprising and consistent 
with the homo economicus model of local residents (Dear, 1992). Home-owners are 
already housed and have an investment motive to protect existing amenity and 
value. Renters are less likely to be so well housed and do not have the investment 
motive, while social renters are generally less well-off and may new house-building 
as improving their chances of getting a better home. 
The housing market in England is very uneven in terms of levels of affordability and 
relative shortage of housing with the greatest need generally acknowledged as being 
in the south and east of the country(Bramley & Karley, 2005; NHPAU, 2009). With 
local decision-making the pattern of support or opposition across regions and types 
of areas is important. Table 2 shows that there is rather less support and stronger 
opposition in the south, compared with the north and midlands. London is more 
polarized, with positive support in inner London and quite strong opposition in 
suburban outer London. This matches existing, recognised patterns, with incomers 
to semi-rural areas in the south of England especially resisting development and is 
consistent with experience in the period 2004-2009 (Abram et al., 1996, Yarwood, 
2002, Sturzaker, 2010, Inch, 2012). Research into housing numbers in the various 
draft stages of Regional Spatial Strategies demonstrated dramatic falls in projected 
housing numbers between draft plan and finalised plan stage in these areas, largely 
due to local opposition to new development (Sturzaker, 2010). 
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Table 2: Support for or Opposition to More Homes being Built in Local Area by Broad 
Region 
Support new homes built 
in local area 
North & 
Midlands South London 
Scotland 
& Wales 
Great 
Britain 
Support strongly 4.3% 3.8% 7.5% 6.4% 4.9% 
Support 24.6% 22.7% 26.7% 32.4% 24.8% 
Neither support nor 
oppose 24.9% 21.4% 17.6% 21.1% 22.5% 
Oppose 31.3% 31.8% 27.3% 25.8% 30.3% 
Oppose strongly 11.9% 17.6% 19.8% 12.4% 15.1% 
 It depends 2.2% 2.7% .9% 1.5% 2.0% 
Don't know .9% 0.0% .2% .4% .4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Majority for Development -14.3% -22.8% -13.0% 0.6% -15.6% 
      
Sample number 1432 1057 306 502 3297 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 2010: see Bramley ‘Housing Attitudes and Changing 
Policies’ in Park et al (2011) 
Overlaying the regional patterns, there is a general tendency for support for new 
housing to be high in larger and more central city areas, where there is generally 
less spare land to build, and somewhat more support in both run-down industrial 
areas and remoter rural areas. From this analysis we can say that the stereotype of 
the middle-class NIMBY community activist in the south of England is broadly 
supported – the areas where opposition to development is strongest are suburban 
and small town areas in more accessible locations, particularly in the prosperous 
south of England.  
Understanding NIMBY attitudes in a localist planning system 
Turning to the causal theories derived from our earlier review and outlined in Table 
1, in light of data from BSASwe can begin to predict the likely outcomes of the spatial 
distribution of NIMBY attitudes. Indeed, much of the evidence for the first causal 
theory which suggested that affluent people and those in higher socio-economic 
groups are more likely to join influential groups, came from research into spatial 
planning processes in the UK (Anonymous and Anonymous, 2013). The possible 
inequities resulting from public engagement in the planning system has been a 
concern since the late 1960s and the publication of the Skeffington report (Damer 
and Hague, 1971). Importantly, under land-use planning legislation in the England 
the lowest level of local government – parish councils – are a statutory consultee that 
local planning authorities must engage with when drafting a development plan or 
deciding on a planning application. As Sturzaker (2010) and Yarwood (2002) 
suggest, parish councils, particularly in rural villages, are dominated by affluent or 
professional, older men, often with professional backgrounds.  
Linking this to the second and third of the causal theories identified in Table 1, the 
highly technical land-use planning system also supports the accumulation and use of 
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cultural capital, in this case conceived of as the knowledge, understanding and 
lingusitic resources appropriate to engagement with the system of planning for 
housing. To engage successfully with the planning system requires knowledge of 
technical planning language, complex technical terms – such as what constitutes a 
“material consideration” –  and knowledge of the system itself and when it is most 
effective to engage. Studies of rural affordable housing provision demonstrate that 
middle-class parish council members are much more likely to have this knowledge 
and be able to apply it within the planning policy process (Yarwood, 2002, Sturzaker, 
2010). The technical nature of planning processes enables the accumulation of this 
cultural capital as well. The study of the development planning process by Abram et 
al (1996) showed how affluent communities would fail to halt a development, but 
would then learn from this about how to influence the planning system more 
effectively and would succeed in relation to future developments. They can also call 
on their social capital, as social links to people of a similar social background, to 
increase their stock of cultural capital – for example through having a retired planner 
leading this role on a parish council or links to the legal profession to raise judicial 
objections to development proposals (Yarwood, 2002).  
The framework of causal theories outlined in table 1 suggest that the planning 
reforms contained in the Localism Act could lead to a reduction in planned housing 
numbers as groups who are inclined to oppose development are empowered to do 
so. These opponents are homo democratus – they use social networks and influence 
to oppose new housing and produce their desired outcome. However, this does not 
tell us what it is that drives the opposition in the first place; is it merely economic self-
interest, albeit expressed through social networks rather than market decisions. The 
financial and local incentives implemented as part of the localism reforms of planning 
for housing (particularly the New Homes Bonus and other financial incentives) 
accept this view of homo economicus. The causal theory in this policy can be 
outlined as a CMO framework as in figure 2. This model includes no contextual 
variation – it is assumed in Open Source Planning and in the Localism Act that all 
communities are equally able to access and influence the planning system. The key 
to delivering new housing under this framework is to overcome the economic costs 
of new development for existing residents through local financial incentives. 
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Figure 2 - CMO framework for homo economicus  
Returning to the BSAS data we can understand and further model whether this is 
indeed the case. Table 3 below suggests that some additional benefits of planning 
gain could change some attitudes if they can be realistically promised and delivered. 
Two-thirds of those who opposed  development less strongly and nearly four-fifths of 
those with no clear view could potentially be swayed to take a supportive position if 
local infrastructure was improved. Less than half of those strongly opposed to 
development could be swayed to a positive stance by any of these possible 
additional benefits. This does suggest that the model of the homo economicus 
NIMBY used in Open Source Planning is not an unrealistic portrayal of a self-
interested home-owner who would welcome new development if immediate local 
costs were mitigated.  
Table 3: What advantages may persuade opponents to support new housing 
development 
Advantages 
Neither 
support 
nor 
oppose Oppose 
Oppose 
strongly All 
      
More employment oppor's 21 18 9 11 
More/improved green spaces/parks 15 9 9 7 
Transport links improved 11 12 7 7 
More/improved schools  9 9 7 6 
More/improved leisure facilities 7 7 5 4 
More/improved shops/supermarkets  6 5 3 3 
More/improved medical facilities 4 5 4 3 
Financial incentives to existing 
residents 2 2 2 1 
Other 2 1 0 1 
Support+it depends 0 0 0 32 
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New/improved library 0 1 0 0 
None of these 22 31 54 23 
 It Depends/don't know 1 1 0 1 
      
Total 
100 100 100 100 
Base       3297 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 2010: see Bramley ‘Housing Attitudes and Changing 
Policies’ in Park et al (2011) 
However, different benefits have varying appeal, and it is clear that a package of 
several benefits would need to be credibly offered to change attitudes significantly. 
The most persuasive side benefit would be improved employment opportunities, as 
local communities tend to be concerned about economic wellbeing (Bramley & Kirk 
2005). Next most important is greenspace and parks: this is in fact relatively easy to 
provide as a by-product of housing so long as land is set aside for the purpose, 
although there may be issues about maintenance and quality and providing a more 
strategic supply of extensive, high-quality park land is more challenging. Improved 
transport links is unsurprisingly important. Much concern about new large housing 
development is the strain extra traffic would place on existing road infrastructure, 
particularly in suburban locations. Typical housing schemes generally entail road 
connections but securing adequate public transport can be more costly and difficult. 
Schools, leisure facilities and shops come next in the ranking, although these are 
commonly delivered through the planning system, such as the CIL and section 106 
payments, or policies and conditions on mixed use developments. 
We have to question how realistic it will be for the planning reforms to deliver these 
benefits and subsequently overcome opposition to new housing. It will be difficult to 
promise new employment as a by-product of a typical housing development, as this 
may require independent investment decisions by private businesses. Nevertheless 
in certain circumstances, including mixed use regeneration schemes and some rural 
situations, there may be a clear link with employment. Our review of middle-class 
activism found instances of local planning authorities and housing associations 
tactically using the provision of affordable housing for local people to overcome 
middle-class opposition by suggesting local rural economies would be supported 
(Yarwood, 2002). Further, while it has become increasingly common to receive 
contributions from developers for new green space, new schools, new transport 
infrastructure and affordable housing using a variety of mechanisms, in the 
immediate future with public capital programmes reduced severely, delivering these 
may become more difficult.  Further, as mentioned above, initial implementation 
suggests that New Homes Bonus is supporting revenue spending in local authorities 
rather than capital investment in new infrastructure and facilities (National Audit 
Office, 2013). 
Predicting and explaining the impact of NIMBY attitudes to new housing in a 
localist planning system 
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The BSAS data can provide a more generalised model of how attitudes towards local 
housing development line up, not just for different groups in the population but also 
for different geographical areas. We have therefore developed a two-step procedure 
to predict the local balance of opinion, conditional on various assumptions. The first 
step is to develop and test a multivariate logistic regression model to predict the 
odds of being a supporter or opponent of development. This can interrogate further 
the attitudinal evidence for the causal model outlined so far. Explanatory variables 
include a standard range of socio-demographic attributes of individuals and 
households, political affiliation and/or other general attitudinal/value proxies, and 
area type categories including some banded environmental characteristics of 
neighbourhoods or local authorities specially attached to the BSAS dataset for this 
purpose. Support for development may be unconditional or conditional, with four 
levels compared: 
1. Support development – no conditions 
2. Support development – assuming public open/greenspace and/or leisure 
facilities are provided/improved  
3. Support development – assuming public open/greenspace and/or leisure 
facilities and/or education and/or healthcare and/or transport facilities are 
provided or improved  
4. Support development – assuming public open/greenspace and/or leisure 
facilities and/or education and/or healthcare and/or transport facilities are 
provided or improved with opposition adjusted for those moderately opposed 
switching preference to supporting development. 
Variables tested in these models include most of the socio-demographic attributes, 
political affiliation and area characteristics (for which local data sources like the 
Census, Index of Multiple Deprivation, voting figures and planning and land data 
could provide approximate equivalents). Variables which were not significant for 
either support or opposition at the different levels were discarded (although we retain 
all of the political variables). The resulting reduced models for support (1. above, 
unconditional) and opposition to development are shown in Table 5 below.  
The model (tables 4 and 5) generally supports the contention that it is Conservative 
party-supporting, older people, people in social class three, and in rural areas who 
are most likely to be opposed to new housing development. Support for local 
housing development is greater, and opposition less, among families with children, 
private and social renters, flat dwellers and households on low incomes. In terms of 
political affiliation, Labour supporters are more likely to support development, and 
the same is true to a lesser extent for Liberal Democrats, whereas Green supporters 
are much less supportive of development.  
Looking at types of geographical area, big city residents are more supportive whilst 
those in villages are less supportive of development. The key regional effect is that 
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the South and Outer London are more negative about development. Those living in 
less deprived neighbourhoods (higher Council Tax banding value) are less 
supportive of development. Those living in areas which have been granting more 
planning permissions for housing and in areas with a lot of existing green space 
(undeveloped land) are more supportive of development, but those living in areas 
with a lot of designated statutory Green Belt are less supportive. These effects are 
mainly in line with expectations. However, it is not claimed that this is necessarily a 
causal model – we are simply trying to obtain a forecasting model to predict current 
levels of support and opposition.  
 Table 4: Logistic Regression Models for Support and Oppose Development 
(British Social Attitudes Survey, 2010) 
 Support   Oppose   
Variable Coeffic B Signif Exp(B) Coeffic B Signif Exp(B) 
Retirement age -0.212 0.063 0.870 0.189 0.057 1.208 
Family with children 0.337 0.001 1.430 -0.137 0.137 0.872 
Private renter 0.291 0.030 1.238 -0.506 0.000 0.603 
Social renter 0.653 0.000 1.563 -0.494 0.000 0.610 
Live in flat 0.447 0.001 1.368 -0.228 0.083 0.796 
Social class 3 -0.312 0.006 0.776 0.353 0.000 1.423 
Low income 0.212 0.052 1.206 -0.042 0.679 0.959 
  Political affiliation      
Labour 0.279 0.006 1.340 -0.348 0.000 0.706 
Liberal Democrat 0.083 0.550 1.196 -0.192 0.116 0.825 
Other (BNP & 
UKIP) -0.201 0.504 1.036 0.278 0.274 1.321 
Green -0.585 0.117 0.636 0.336 0.256 1.399 
 Area attributes       
Big city 0.069 0.700 1.224 -0.295 0.089 0.745 
Village -0.234 0.111 0.676 0.404 0.002 1.498 
Low density  0.064 0.668 1.001 -0.232 0.081 0.793 
South/Outer 
London -0.096 0.331 0.891 0.319 0.000 1.376 
Very satisfied area 0.407 0.000 1.290 -0.329 0.000 0.720 
Very unsatisfied 
area 0.184 0.501 0.869 0.407 0.117 1.503 
Deprivation 
banding -0.177 0.000 0.878 0.123 0.002 1.130 
Planning Perm's 
band 0.016 0.039 1.016 -0.007 0.296 0.993 
Greenspace band 0.078 0.006 1.057 -0.110 0.000 0.896 
Green Belt band -0.062 0.003 0.965 0.077 0.000 1.080 
       
Constant -1.218 0.000 0.447 0.068 0.759 1.071 
 Chi-sq d f signif Chi-sq d f signif 
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Overall model 208.39 21 0.000 213.7 21 0.000 
-2 Log Likelihood 3051.7   3599.6   
Pseudo R Sq Cox&Snell Nagelkerke Cox&Snell Nagelkerke 
 0.073 0.105  0.075 0.100  
% correct 
predictions 73.1     61.0     
 
The second step in this exercise is to move to the local authority (district) level of 
analysis and to apply the coefficients from these models to an equivalent set of 
variables compiled at that area level. It is necessary to do this because the BSAS 
sample size is not sufficient to take values directly from the survey at the level of 
district council. Data on socio-demographics and land and planning factors are taken 
from a dataset developed to support the development of a sub-regional housing 
market model (Andrew et al 2010), derived from the 2001 Census and other sources 
and in some cases updated to 2007. The political affiliation variables are mapped 
across to voting in the 2010 General Election, reapportioned from constituencies to 
local authority districts. Satisfaction with areas scores are derived from pooled data 
from the Survey of English Housing 1997-2007.  
The resulting predicted levels of support and opposition at different levels of 
conditionality are shown in Table 5, for regions and two area typologies. The overall 
levels of support (unconditional) and opposition shown in the first two columns are 
similar to those found within the BSAS as reported in Table 2, giving a majority 
against development of -16.5% of all (including those without a view), or -23% of 
those with a view. This is the figure across the whole of England. At regional level 
the majority against development ranges from -7.5% in the North East to -24.4% in 
the South East. However, the most rural areas show a small majority in favour of 
development (2.0%), compared with -18% in both urban and slightly rural areas. 
There is also a slight majority for development in Central London (2%), with stronger 
opposition in London suburbs (-31.5%) and Prospering areas (-20.6%).  
Table 5: Predicted Support, Opposition and Majorities for Development Under 
Different Conditional Assumptions by Region and Type of Locality 
Area Type   
Pro-
devel 
Pro-
devel 
Pro-
devel 
Pro-
devel 
  
Support 
1 
Oppose 
1 
Majority 
1 Major 2 Major 3 Major 4 
 G O Region       
NORTH 0.311 0.386 -0.075 0.030 0.045 0.350 
YORKS & HUMB 0.283 0.407 -0.124 0.002 0.003 0.345 
NORTH WEST 0.278 0.421 -0.144 -0.026 -0.021 0.320 
EAST MIDLANDS 0.311 0.368 -0.056 0.053 0.070 0.365 
WEST MIDLANDS 0.276 0.416 -0.141 -0.027 -0.021 0.310 
SOUTH WEST 0.287 0.459 -0.172 -0.080 -0.054 0.292 
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EAST 0.267 0.491 -0.224 -0.131 -0.111 0.239 
SOUTH EAST 0.257 0.501 -0.244 -0.151 -0.132 0.235 
LONDON 0.285 0.472 -0.188 -0.085 -0.072 0.316 
Total 0.280 0.445 -0.165 -0.060 -0.046 0.301 
 Urban-Rural       
Urban 0.274 0.454 -0.179 -0.064 -0.057 0.311 
Some Rural 0.273 0.455 -0.183 -0.081 -0.067 0.278 
Quite Rural 0.305 0.409 -0.104 -0.021 0.008 0.303 
Most Rural 0.350 0.330 0.020 0.095 0.131 0.380 
 LA Supergroup       
Cities and Services 0.285 0.401 -0.117 0.021 0.022 0.381 
Coastal and 
Country 0.304 0.420 -0.116 -0.035 -0.005 0.294 
London Centre 0.357 0.338 0.019 0.136 0.145 0.487 
London Cosmop 0.318 0.491 -0.173 -0.089 -0.061 0.342 
London Suburbs 0.241 0.556 -0.315 -0.222 -0.207 0.204 
Mining and 
Manufact 0.285 0.426 -0.141 -0.034 -0.024 0.302 
Prospering UK 0.266 0.472 -0.206 -0.113 -0.095 0.250 
Total 0.280 0.445 -0.165 -0.060 -0.046 0.301 
Note on levels of conditionality: 1. no conditions; 2 support if open space & leisure provision; 
3. support if wider range of public facilities including transport, education & health; 4. as 3. 
but allowing previous moderate opponents to switch to support.  
Assuming a moderate level of delivery of public green/open space and leisure 
facilities accompanying new housing, the figures move towards near neutrality or in 
some cases positive support for development (level 2, column 4). Regions with 
majority support, albeit small, would include North East, Yorkshire & Humber, and 
East Midlands. Support would be more clear-cut (9.5% majority) in the most rural 
areas. Support would be also gained in Cities and Services and Central London. 
Increasing the planning gain ‘offer’ to include education, health and transport would 
see only a modest further move towards majority support, so long as we assume no 
actual opponents of development switch sides (Level 3, column 5). The only other 
area type to switch to supporting development is ‘quite rural’. However, if we 
assumed that this broad planning gain offer in terms of public facilities was generally 
deliverable and that previous moderate opponents of development might thereby 
switch their view, then the picture is transformed, and you would then have clear 
majorities for development in all cases, column 6. 
In line with broader evidence on community activism in planning, these results do 
suggest that if direct benefits can be delivered through new development then it is 
more often supported (Sturzaker, 2011). However, the evidence shows this is more 
complex than the homo economicus concept as utilised in Open Source Planning 
and presented in figure 2. In fact, the extent of what is required to assuage 
opposition highlights the extent of the misunderstanding of opponents. Looking at 
table 2, direct financial incentives to overcome costs to residents, originally part of 
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the Open Source Planning, and implemented to an extent in the NHB and CIL, have 
little impact on whether people would support new development. 
While the analysis of attitudinal data suggests that typical resident-voters may be 
willing to agree, in a marginal way, to packages of new homes with additional 
community benefits, this may not be sufficient to increase the supply of housing. 
These preferences, which may be evenly balanced, have to then be translated 
through local political process – it is democratic processes, not market processes, 
that will decide where new housing gets built. The evidence from our review of 
middle-class activism aligns with this attitudinal data to support the concept of homo 
democraticus to describe these groups in two distinct ways.  Firstly, the evidence 
shows that these groups who are most opposed are more likely to have the social 
capital to actively oppose development. As stated, they are more likely to be 
members of Parish Councils, statutory consultees in the planning system, and more 
likely to have contacts to planners and lawyers who can assist them in making an 
appropriate opposition (Abram et al., 1996, Yarwood, 2002, Holman and Rydin, 
2012). Thus, although in any area there may not be a majority opposed to 
development, it is likely that in an electoral process they will get their voices heard or 
have broader impact on deliberative process (Sturzaker, 2011). Further, evidence 
from similarly controversial proposals, such as school closures, demonstrates the 
ability of these groups to successful deploy their knowledge and cultural resources to 
develop stronger coalitions; effectively ensuring people become more strongly 
opposed to development (Bondi, 1988, Archer, 2010). In particular, it is causal 
mechanism three – the alignment of cultural capital between aggrieved residents and 
local elected members – that may have particular salience in these cases.  
Secondly, we have to have a more complex understanding of the motives behind this 
opposition, particularly recognising belonging to neighbourhoods and communities. 
The widespread opposition to development in the south and east is concerning as 
this is generally where villages and towns affected by in-migration by commuters 
who electively belong to a “historic” rural idyll (Watt, 2009, Savage, 2010, Benson 
and Jackson, 2012). As the literature on elective and selective belonging shows, 
much of the economic capital invested in housing is converted into symbolic capital – 
a statement of the self and one’s socio-economic position. As Savage (2010: 132) 
discusses, the location of one’s home, its design and décor, are closely related to 
how people see themselves in the world and ‘the middle class culturally engaged are 
actually highly vested in their location…What matters more is the sense that they live 
somewhere appropriate for “someone like me”.’ To put it simply, new development is 
not seen as a threat to people’s investment in their homes, but a threat to their social 
identity. The neighbourhood would stop being for people like them. The strength of 
this feeling is demonstrated in research such as Watt’s in which there is an account 
of resident’s employing a lawyer to resist a proposed development that would reduce 
environmental amenity in their neighbourhood (Watt, 2009). More starkly in 
Sturzaker’s research, a middle-class parish councillor explained their tactical use of 
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the planning system to prevent new development: ‘In order to keep riff-raff from 
[nearby city] out of the community you need this s106 agreement' suggest a more 
base snobbery, closely linked to belonging (Sturzaker, 2010: 1014). Thus the “offer” 
from the planning system to overcome opposition needs to be sufficiently rich to 
support a sense of local and self-identity; financial compensation will always be 
insufficient. 
Conclusion 
The neighbourhood planning proposals in the Localism Act have empowered local 
groups to produce their own plan which will be accepted as the key planning 
document for a locality so long as it is in line with national planning guidance as well 
as  the local development framework produced by the local planning authority, and it 
is agreed at a local referendum. Although the UK Government has attempted to 
incentivise new development, the evidence suggests that the neighbourhood 
planning proposals are a policy mechanism that is particularly susceptible to causal 
theories of middle-class activism. In particular, Neighbourhood Plans may act as a 
vehicle for legitimisation of activist, influential opposition, driven by socio-cultural 
identity, as a spoiling tactic in debates about how much housing gets built where.  
 
Figure 3 - CMO framework for housing delivery under Localism Act 
The implementation of the reforms has actually produced mechanisms that are likely 
to support, rather than challenge, the existing bias towards affluent groups, heavily 
invested in their place, in the planning system (figure 3). For example, although any 
group can come forward to develop a neighbourhood plan, they need to secure a 
majority vote in a referendum. This has raised fears that less affluent would not have 
the resources, either in terms of time and money or cultural capital and knowledge of 
the planning system to come forward with their own proposals. The plans must also 
be in line with local, national and European policy and statute, for example requiring 
a strategic environmental assessment. Local authorities are meant to support local 
communities in developing the plans, however as they lose staff it is likely this 
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support may not be forthcoming. The neighbourhood planning proposals therefore 
benefit those communities that can organise most successfully and those that can 
draw on their own expertise and cultural capital (Buser, 2012).  
Further, the geography of opposition revealed through our analysis of BSAS data 
makes it doubly problematic. Opposition is greatest in places where new housing is 
most needed – the south and east – and it is in these types of areas we are most 
likely to see the elective and selective belonging of incoming commuter residents 
tied to self-identity and underpinned by emotional involvement, driving opposition. 
Returning to the concepts of localism and the Big Society, in promoting a conception 
of atomistic, individualised homo economicus who would respond to financial 
incentives in the localist planning for housing reforms, the government have 
inadvertently strengthened the broader, civic, Big Society. These opponents are the 
embodiment of the proposed transformation of English society – they are well 
connected with a strong sense of civic duty; volunteer for their parish council; and 
are highly invested in their community and neighbourhood. It is this that drives their 
successful opposition to new housing. 
The key challenge that will therefore emerge for localist planning is whether the 
democratic fora developing neighbourhood plans – Parish Councils or 
neighbourhood forums – provide an adequate space for debate. The broad evidence 
on planning processes that are designed to empower communities demonstrates 
that a good, well mediated process can produce consensual planning outcomes 
among diverse stakeholders (Innes and Booher, 2010). The benefits required to 
overcome opposition to new development are such that it will be this level of 
collaborative working between communities, developers and local planning 
authorities that will be required to deliver new housing. Arguably, the 2003 
Sustainable Communities plan from the former Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
attempted this (ODPM, 2003) with proposals for higher quality housing development 
providing broad benefits to local communities. However, in practice such 
collaborative working takes time, investment and for participants to move beyond 
their individual interests and identify common interests. As noted by many 
commentaries on the Big Society and localism, while some of the policy intentions 
are worthy, without investment in community development they are unlikely to deliver 
empowerment (Bailey and Pill, 2011, Jacobs and Manzi, 2012, Sullivan, 2012). In a 
period of austerity, it is exactly these types of services, within planning departments 
and broader local government that are being cut (Hastings et.al. 2013).  
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